On Short-term and Long-term Repeated Game Behavior- A Case Study of Oligopolistic Transportation Enterprises with Government Intervention under Fuzzy Environment

The transportation sector has always been dedicated to energy conservation and emission reduction. In an effort to optimize the transportation structure and promote the energy conservation and emission reduction of the transportation sector, the government has implemented numerous intervention policies. This paper aims to explore how the implementation objects of the intervention strategy interact with one another. Based on the price game model, the fuzzy triangular variables are used to construct the duopoly game competition model under the different situations of subsidy, carbon quota, and carbon tax. According to the results, (1) Subsidy policy will lead to excessive dependence, although it can improve the price competitive advantage of railway transport most significantly. (2) Under the carbon quota policy, transportation companies maximize predicted profits and social benefit. In the long-term repeated game, railway transport has more space to adjust price than road transport. (3) Under government intervention policies, increasing the substitution rate of transport products can improve social benefits.