业务
债权人
货币经济学
市场份额
收益
股票市场
库存(枪支)
经济干预主义
政府(语言学)
金融体系
经济
财务
政治学
马
法学
古生物学
语言学
哲学
工程类
债务
政治
生物
机械工程
作者
Jeffery Chang,Qingbin Meng,Xiaoran Ni
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.pacfin.2022.101754
摘要
This paper examines the relation between share pledging and corporate risk-taking in an environment featured by strong government intervention and high information opacity. We find that during the years 2005 through 2015, the level of share pledging is associated with less volatile earnings and tightened R&D expenditures for Chinese listed firms. We establish causality through a variety of econometric techniques, including a difference-in-differences approach based on a regulatory change that permits security companies to lend money to borrowers pledging their shares as collaterals. In addition, we find that share pledging is associated with enhanced innovation efficiency. Overall, our results highlight that share pledging constrains excessive risk-taking and improves the efficiency of risky investments through facilitating creditor monitoring.
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