剑
激励
晋升(国际象棋)
公司治理
业务
水质
中国
政治
政府(语言学)
权力下放
地方政府
控制(管理)
环境规划
分水岭
行动计划
环境资源管理
质量(理念)
中央政府
美国对点源水污染的监管
匹配(统计)
环境经济学
水污染
水工业
城市化
公共行政
水资源
污染
政治制度
授权
环境保护
作者
Xiaoyu Zhao,Wenzhang Liu,毛寿龙,Hongtao Yi
标识
DOI:10.1177/15396754251366923
摘要
The government plays a vital role in water pollution control in developing countries. Chinese local governments have launched the River Chief System (RCS) to reduce water pollution. The case of Taihu Lake in Wuxi City, which had major issues with water pollution, demonstrates how the RCS can address responsibility decentralization by changing the governance structure and creating political incentives for local government leaders. This study quantitatively evaluates the RCS policy effect using the difference-in-difference method by matching water quality and prefecture-level city data in China from 2004 to 2014. The results show that the RCS improves water quality. Furthermore, incorporating water quality metrics into the cadre evaluation system significantly enhances officials’ promotion prospects. Moreover, leaders are highly incentivized to achieve targets directly associated with their promotion. Placing political pressure on leaders by hanging the sword of Damocles over them is an effective strategy in governing the local commons.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI