声誉
发行人
首次公开发行
货币经济学
价值(数学)
投资银行业务
投资(军事)
业务
经济
金融经济学
微观经济学
财务
社会科学
计算机科学
政治
机器学习
政治学
社会学
法学
作者
Randolph P. Beatty,Jay R. Ritter
标识
DOI:10.1016/0304-405x(86)90055-3
摘要
This paper develops and tests two propositions. We demonstrate that there is a monotone relation between the (expected) underpricing of an initial public offering and the uncertainty of investors regarding its value. We also argue that the resulting underpricing equilibrium is enforced by investment bankers, who have reputation capital at stake. An investment banker who ‘cheats’ on this underpricing equilibrium will lose either potential investors (if it doesn't underprice enough) or issuers (if it underprices too much), and thus forfeit the value of its reputation capital. Empirical evidence supports our propositions.
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