匹配(统计)
业务
产业组织
工作(物理)
创业
营销
财务
机械工程
统计
数学
工程类
作者
Cláudia Custódio,Miguel A. Ferreira,Pedro Matos
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2017-09-25
卷期号:65 (2): 459-476
被引量:469
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2828
摘要
We show that firms with chief executive officers (CEOs) who gain general managerial skills over their lifetime of work experience produce more patents. We address the potential endogenous CEO–firm matching bias using firm–CEO fixed effects and variation in the enforceability of noncompete agreements across states and over time during the CEO’s career. Our findings suggest that generalist CEOs spur innovation because they acquire knowledge beyond the firm’s current technological domain, and they have skills that can be applied elsewhere should innovation projects fail. We conclude that an efficient labor market for executives can promote innovation by providing a mechanism of tolerance for failure. The Internet appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2828 . This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
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