The Psychology of Virtue and Happiness in Western and Asian Thought

The contemporary discussion of well-being pays homage to Aristotle as a founder of the field and accepts many of his individual claims yet neglects his overall account of well-being. Perhaps this is because Aristotle underemphasizes the role of factors beyond a person's control in moral development (e.g., heredity, upbringing, sociopolitical environment) in order to focus on how individuals can act well, and then seems to end up with implausible claims. Conversely, the Capabilities Approach (CA) is a currently respected, Aristotelian research program that focuses on the role of factors beyond a person's control in moral development, and makes eminently plausible claims, but provides only a part of an account of well-being.1 I shall sketch CA, highlighting its incompleteness and its points of disagreement with Aristotle's account as usually interpreted. Then I shall develop and defend a plausible version of Aristotle's account. I shall exploit the fact that Aristotle's account of well-being and CA complement each other by combining them. Finally, I shall point out the extent to which this combined account is supported by common sense and the current social science research, and indicate what remains to be done.