自由裁量权
变通办法
顺从(心理学)
胁迫(语言学)
国家警察
国家(计算机科学)
考试(生物学)
法学
政治学
业务
心理学
执法
社会心理学
古生物学
程序设计语言
哲学
生物
语言学
计算机科学
算法
作者
Étienne Charbonneau,Yves Boisvert,Luc Bégin
标识
DOI:10.1080/15309576.2022.2162940
摘要
This study examines rule non-compliance from police officers and managers who decide not to enforce certain public health edicts and decrees. It examines rule non-compliance from police officers and managers who decide not to enforce certain public health edicts and decrees. The locus of our study is the severity of the consequences for rule non-compliance for citizens. We test to see whether rules with severe punishments for citizens are broken, bent, or worked around by the police more often than expected in Bozeman observations. Thirty-seven police chiefs and managers were interviewed. Sixteen focus groups totaling 149 police officers were held in 15 municipalities in a Canadian province. Non-compliance related to police officers not enforcing 1556 Canadian dollars (US$1260; 1082€) fines was high. This study provides credence that workaround is a flexible concept explaining how discretion is used on the frontlines of public service.
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