软件即服务
激励
服务提供商
结果(博弈论)
供应链
纳什均衡
互联网
业务
计算机科学
应用程序服务提供商
产业组织
软件
垄断
服务(商务)
过程管理
营销
微观经济学
软件开发
经济
万维网
程序设计语言
服务设计
作者
Haluk Demirkan,Hsing Keneth Cheng,Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay
标识
DOI:10.2753/mis0742-1222260405
摘要
The computing industry is gradually evolving to cater to the demand for software-as-a-service (SaaS). Two core competencies that have emerged over the past few years are that of the application service providers (ASPs) and the application infrastructure providers (AIPs). The arrangements between them result in system dynamics that is typical in supply chain networks. We examine the performance of an SaaS set up under different coordination strategies between these two players. Our analysis indicates that coordination between the monopoly ASP and the AIP can result in an outcome with the same overall surplus as can be achieved by a central planner. Even though the players have an incentive to deviate, it is possible to create the right incentives so that the economically efficient outcome is also the Nash equilibrium. The results of the analysis have significant implications for the coordination strategies for providers in the burgeoning business model of delivering software services over the Internet.
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