业务
限制
晋升(国际象棋)
劳动经济学
机制(生物学)
市场份额
流量(数学)
会计
人口经济学
产业组织
人事变更率
作者
Taylor A. Begley,Peter H. Haslag,Daniel Weagley
摘要
Using résumé data on over 20 million U.S. workers, we find that the flow of employees between a pair of firms sharply drops by about 20% during periods in which the firms share a board director. This relationship is stronger in settings where firms have greater potential gains from limiting worker mobility and is most pronounced for higher-skilled employees. Moreover, we find more connected firms have lower rates of internal promotion and no improvements in employee satisfaction. The evidence is consistent with shared directors serving as a mechanism for labor market coordination.
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