Tripartite evolutionary game analysis on corporate carbon reduction decisions considering dual supervision under carbon trading

The obstruction of carbon emission reduction caused by negative enterprises' behavior of reducing carbon emissions has posed a challenge to realizing China's dual-carbon goal. To better comprehend the interest conflicts associated with stakeholders in reducing carbon emissions, strengthen the dual supervision framework, and motivate enterprises to reduce carbon emissions, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the interactive behavior of the government, enterprises, and customers. Based on analyzing the direct influence of the government on customers' behavior, we analyze the impact of the government and customers on enterprises' behavior. The study demonstrates that: 1) The behavior of enterprises will be significantly impacted by their net incomes as well as the government and customers' initial willingness to participate under dual supervision. 2) The dynamic of government supervision must be kept within a reasonable range to encourage enterprises to reduce carbon emissions and direct customers to buy low-carbon products. In addition, enhancing the dynamic of customer supervision will accelerate the decision-making behavior of enterprises. 3) Customers are more sensitive to subsidies for low-carbon consumption than consumption tax. The effect of high additional reputational benefits on enterprises' behavior is similar to the combination of high subsidies for low-carbon consumption and low consumption tax. Thus, the results detail the effective strategy and insights for enterprises to reduce carbon emissions with the involvement of stakeholders and provide policy recommendations to strengthen the dual supervision system.