业务
供应链
晋升(国际象棋)
服务(商务)
电子商务
帕累托最优
营销
微观经济学
经济
计算机科学
万维网
多目标优化
政治
政治学
法学
机器学习
作者
Yujie Zhang,Jianhu Cai,Xueshu Shan,Siqing Li,Yongyi Shou
摘要
Abstract In shopping days, e‐commerce platforms (ECPs) and their sellers cooperate to promote sales through price discount and marketing effort. Supply chain finance (SCF) has been offered by ECPs to fuel sellers' preparations for shopping days. An ECP‐seller supply chain (PSSC) model is constructed to study the strategic interaction between the ECP and the seller. Given a price discount rate, we derive the ECP's optimal marketing effort level and feasible SCF service rule, as well as the seller's optimal supply quantity and financing decisions. Furthermore, we identify a price‐discount‐rate interval, in which the Pareto improvement of the PSSC can be achieved.
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