垄断
学习效果
微观经济学
单位成本
投资(军事)
营销
估价(财务)
战略互补
单位(环理论)
业务
产业组织
经济
产品(数学)
政治
数学教育
数学
政治学
财务
法学
几何学
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2011-06-04
卷期号:57 (10): 1788-1801
被引量:35
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1355
摘要
When learning of product characteristics takes some time, a firm introducing a new durable faces the trade-off between releasing early to an uninformed market and deferring release to a better-informed market. In a two-period monopoly, we examine the strategic interaction between exogenous learning (EL) and seller-induced learning (SIL) and the firm's product release and pricing strategies. The familiar, direct effect of strong learning is to facilitate a higher price for informed customers. We point out its indirect effect of inducing a higher period 1 price for uninformed customers (by lowering their expected utility from learning). These two effects underlie three major results. First, a strong learning intensity does not always imply deferred release. Surprisingly, for medium unit costs, the firm releases late (early) when learning intensity is weak (strong). Second, SIL facilitates different product release strategies, depending on the unit cost level. Potential SIL investment facilitates early release for low or medium unit costs, but may facilitate deferred release for high unit costs. Lastly, when customers have heterogeneous prior valuation, the high-end customers may buy early at a lower price and the low-end customers may buy later at a higher price, contrary to the usual skim pricing with informed customers. This paper was accepted by Preyas Desai, marketing.
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