货币经济学
投资(军事)
股东
约束(计算机辅助设计)
债权人
面板数据
情感(语言学)
经济
业务
索引(排版)
工具变量
财务
倾向得分匹配
样品(材料)
省略变量偏差
控制(管理)
变量(数学)
面板分析
控制变量
国家所有制
投资决策
公司治理
激励
广义矩量法
变量
代理成本
内生性
金融体系
计量经济学
劳动经济学
持续时间(音乐)
投资策略
财富效应
委托代理问题
预算约束
作者
Malaya Prakash Behera,Mithun Samanta,Ajay Kumar Mishra
标识
DOI:10.1177/09726527261458865
摘要
This study examines whether share pledging by controlling shareholders improves investment efficiency in India. Using a panel of 1,167 listed firms from 2009 to 2023, we find that pledging improves investment efficiency by simultaneously reducing overinvestment (12.41%) and underinvestment (3.62%), effects confirmed through channel analyses showing that creditor monitoring drives the overinvestment reduction, while financing access drives the underinvestment reduction. These effects are stronger in financially constrained and group-affiliated firms. Findings are robust to alternative constraint proxies, including the size–age index and size tercile, an augmented investment model, propensity score matching, and Oster omitted variable bias bounds. JEL Codes: G30, G31, G32, G38, M41, O16
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