TRAP: Timely Revocable Authentication Protocol for Scheduled Handovers in Space-Sea Integrated Networks

Frequent handovers between Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites in Space-Sea Integrated Networks (SSINs) pose significant security challenges. Existing authentication protocols often lack timely and effective revocation mechanisms for invalid satellites. Attackers can exploit these expired keys to establish unauthorized connections, enabling impersonation and replay attacks against maritime users. To address this, we propose TRAP, a timely revocable authentication protocol tailored for scheduled satellite handovers. TRAP leverages the predictable orbital paths of LEO satellites to pre-generate and distribute revocation lists, valid-key lists, and corresponding membership and non-membership proofs. It effectively mitigates revocation difficulties in environments with weak connectivity and high latency. Additionally, TRAP employs time-lock puzzle technology for the timed release of revocation data, precisely scheduled handovers with neighboring satellites. Security and performance analyses demonstrate that TRAP effectively resists common network threats while maintaining satisfactory computational and communication efficiency.