建议(编程)
激励
付款
补偿(心理学)
微观经济学
责任
非线性定价
经济
业务
控制(管理)
精算学
产业组织
财务
计算机科学
管理
程序设计语言
心理学
精神分析
作者
Jun Honda,Roman Inderst,Marco Ottaviani
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2023-04-11
卷期号:70 (2): 1301-1314
被引量:4
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4750
摘要
We introduce a model of advice in which firms steer advisors through nonlinear incentive schemes. In addition to developing an isomorphism to pricing with mixed bundling, we obtain three main insights. First, firms optimally use nonlinear bonuses to economize on the rent paid to advisors. Second, equilibrium bonus payments induce advisors to make biased recommendations that are artificially contingent on each other, resulting in an inefficient allocation. Third, if advisor liability is stepped up, firms respond by increasing the size of the bonus, leaving advisor bias unchanged. These results shed light on prevailing compensation practices for advisors and support direct regulatory interference. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
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