Joint effects of remanufacturing channel design and after-sales service pricing: an analytical study

We conduct an analytical study on remanufacturing channel design and after-sales service pricing, which jointly affect the sustainability and profitability of the supply chain. We model a supply chain with one manufacturer and one independent retailer. The manufacturer, as the Stackelberg game leader, engages in remanufacturing to take advantage of production cost savings. The collection of the used products can be carried out by either the manufacturer or the retailer. After-sales service, for example, extended warranty, is offered with the product and is sold separately. The service provider can be either the manufacturer or the retailer. We use game theoretic models to answer an important research question: How do remanufacturing and after-sales service jointly affect channel selection decisions? We explore the benefits of joint decision making in terms of remanufacturing efficiency and after-sales service performance. We find that it is most efficient for the retailer to collect the used product for remanufacturing and to offer after-sales service, because the retailer simultaneously makes decisions regarding remanufacturing and after-sales service and thus reduces double marginalisation in the supply chain. We also demonstrate numerically how the costs of collecting used products and providing after-sales service impact channel selection decisions.