计算机科学
散列函数
钥匙(锁)
认证(法律)
计算机安全
互联网
方案(数学)
相互认证
报文认证码
旁道攻击
公钥密码术
客户端
密码学
计算机网络
嵌入式系统
万维网
加密
数学
数学分析
作者
Qingyang Zhang,Xiaolong Zhou,Hong Zhong,Jie Cui,Jiaxin Li,Debiao He
标识
DOI:10.1109/tifs.2024.3451357
摘要
Several authentication and key agreement (AKA) schemes have been proposed to ensure secure communication in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). However, most of these schemes face two primary problems. First, they cannot resist various attacks, such as impersonation and device capture attacks. Second, these schemes overlook the resource-constrained IIoT devices, failing to guarantee lightweight overhead for device operations. Therefore, we propose a novel and efficient AKA scheme. Utilizing the chameleon hash function and physical unclonable function, the proposed scheme implements a lightweight overhead for both authentication parties while maintaining the overhead of the gateway within a reasonable range. Furthermore, we implement device anonymity based on lightweight operations such as hash and XOR. In addition, we perform a rigorous security analysis using the widely accepted Real-Or-Random model, BAN logic, and Proverif tool. Finally, through heuristic analysis and experiments, we substantiate that our scheme surpasses the compared schemes in terms of both security attributes and system overhead.
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