斯塔克伯格竞赛
双层优化
碳排放税
电
水泥
灵敏度(控制系统)
碳纤维
平衡(能力)
环境经济学
发电
温室气体
高效能源利用
废物管理
能量(信号处理)
非线性系统
计算机科学
能量平衡
能源系统
数学优化
正多边形
凸优化
环境科学
政府(语言学)
工艺工程
工程类
线性规划
电力系统
热电联产
博弈论
作者
Yushu Wang,Minglei Yang,Vassilis M. Charitopoulos,Min Zhou,Wenli Du
摘要
Abstract Cement industries generate significant CO 2 emissions, necessitating carbon capture and utilization (CCU) schemes for their abatement. This study proposes a bilevel Stackelberg game framework, where government and integrated energy systems (IES) regulate ladder‐type carbon taxes and time‐of‐use (TOU) electricity pricing, while cement plants optimize the allocation ratio between two CO 2 handling methods (direct CO 2 emissions and hydrogen‐assisted CO 2 processing). The resulting nonconvex mixed‐integer nonlinear program (MINLP) features a nonconvex upper level and a convex lower level, solved to global optimality using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) reformulation. Compared to the single cement model, the bilevel model reduces total CO 2 handling costs by 68.4% ($705,855/d) and the related emissions by 27.6% (506 ton/d). Sensitivity analysis indicates that higher carbon taxes reduce CO 2 emissions but raise handling costs, while lower electricity prices decrease them both. These findings establish a foundation for cement‐IES integration, enabling policymakers to balance environmental‐economic performance through carbon tax and electricity pricing adjustments.
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