制裁
执行
胁迫(语言学)
约束(计算机辅助设计)
利比里亚元
激励
通信源
货币
业务
国际经济学
经济
法律与经济学
政治学
公共经济学
货币经济学
财务
微观经济学
法学
机械工程
工程类
哲学
电信
语言学
计算机科学
作者
Navin R Bapat,Bryan Robert Early,Julia Grauvogel,Katja B. Kleinberg
摘要
Abstract Economic sanctions remain one of the most widely used foreign policy tools. At the same time, their enforcement is often incomplete and selective. If sender states are concerned about sanctions effectiveness, variation in enforcement is counterproductive. We argue that sender states face a trade-off between effective coercion in the present and the ability to use coercion in the future. We develop a formal model to explore the mixed incentives of senders such as the United States in enforcing their financial sanctions against banks. Using data on US enforcement actions taken in support of the Iranian sanctions regime from 2003 to 2014 and three illustrative case examples, we evaluate the hypothesis that sanctions enforcement should be greater when the position of the US dollar is strong relative to alternative settlement mechanisms. Our findings support this contention.
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