首次公开发行
业务
风险投资
股东
内生性
财务
货币经济学
金融体系
会计
经济
公司治理
计量经济学
作者
Heejin Woo,Sukwoong Choi
出处
期刊:Proceedings - Academy of Management
[Academy of Management]
日期:2020-07-29
卷期号:2020 (1): 17939-17939
标识
DOI:10.5465/ambpp.2020.17939abstract
摘要
This study investigates how venture capital (VC) ownership affects strategy and financial performance of newly public firms after IPOs. We find that a significant proportion of VC firms hold shares after the IPO of their investee company. Given that VC funds typically have a fixed life, we expect there is a conflict of interest between VC shareholders and newly public firms. VC shareholders that want to maximize returns in the short run may hinder newly public firms’ managers from investing in projects that are potentially value- creating but time-consuming. Therefore, we argue that post-IPO VC ownership discourages newly public firms’ long-term investments such as R&D, workforce, and capital expenditure, and as a result, it affects financial performance negatively. In an analysis of VC-backed newly public firms in U.S. technology-intensive industries where long horizon corporate investment is particularly critical, we find supportive evidence of these arguments while addressing potential endogeneity concerns.
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