Correlative externalism about colour phenomenology

ABSTRACTExternalism about colour phenomenology claims that the phenomenal character of colour experiences is determined by mind-independent properties of perceptual objects. The structural mismatch argument shows that physical properties of perceived mind-independent things are not similar in ways that correlate with the ways in which the phenomenal character of colour experiences are similar. Structural mismatch has thus been perceived by some to demonstrate that correlative externalism (which takes mind-independent physical properties to correlate systematically with colour phenomenology) is false. This argument is defused if there are broad physical properties that can bear similarity relations that do correlate with those held by the phenomenal character of colour experiences. I defend the view that disjunctive properties can perform this role by showing that disjunctive properties can account for metamerism, the unique and binary hue distinction, and differences in perceived colours between subjects. Finally, I argue that correlative externalism is better placed than other views to explain why the physical properties identified by the physical sciences correlate with colour experiences with the particular phenomenal character they have.KEYWORDS: Externalismdisjunctive propertiesstructural mismatchcolour phenomenologyperceptual experiencecolour AcknowledgementThe author is grateful for very helpful feedback from anonymous reviewers.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Here, I have adapted Allen’s iteration of the argument from structure but with explicit mention of colour phenomenology as opposed to colour (as this is the focus of this essay), and correlations as opposed to identity (Allen, Citation2014, p. 195). This latter change is because the version I state here threatens not only physicalist but some dualist externalist theories and thus requires a more wide-ranging response.2. Disjunctivism, as in the belief in disjunctive properties, is not to be confused with disjunctivism about mental states, which claims that perceptual states are of a fundamentally distinct kind to mental states such as hallucinatory states (see Byrne & Logue, Citation2009 for further reading on the latter disjunctivism).3. There are philosophical questions related to blurry experiences that ask how blurry experiences represent the world and what this tells us about perceptual experiences more generally (e.g., Allen, Citation2013; Pautz, Citation2010; Skrzypulec, Citation2021; Smith, Citation2008), but I am here only using blurry vision as an analogy and not as something to be explained in its own right.