Type Diversity of Institutional Investors and Opportunistic Acquisitions

Institutional investors of different types have been shown to exert differential influences on firm strategic decisions individually. Yet, research has largely overlooked how institutional investors of different types can collectively affect firm decision-making. This study investigates the legal type diversity of institutional ownership (hereafter “investor type diversity”) and its influence on corporate acquisitions. Because institutional investors with different legal types have distinct interests and objectives, investor type diversity can create principal–principal conflicts and prevent institutional investors from undertaking coordinated actions, weakening their collective power and ability to play a governance role. We posit that investor type diversity will be positively associated with CEOs’ opportunistic acquisitions because the dilution of shareholder governance, resulting from investor type diversity, grants CEOs the leeway to champion acquisitions aligned more with their personal gains. We also argue that the positive influence of investor type diversity on opportunistic acquisitions will be stronger when CEOs possess a higher level of general managerial ability. However, acquisitions pursued in the presence of higher investor type diversity will be associated with poorer performance. Findings from a sample of 2,106 U.S. firms lend support to our arguments. This study advances strategy research by highlighting the importance of investor type diversity in shaping shareholder governance effectiveness.