How to promote the sustainable development of prefabricated residential buildings in China: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Prefabricated residential buildings (PRBs) have drawn worldwide attention over the past few decades because of growing evidence of sustainability improvements for the building sector. However, the development of PRBs in China did not turn out as expected under the influence of PRB stakeholders' behavioral strategies. Previous studies have ignored the quantitative analysis of the existing benefit games among PRB stakeholders. Based on evolutionary game theory, this research explored evolutionary decision-making behaviors and stable strategies of the three stakeholders involved in the PRB industry, including the government, real estate developers, and homebuyers. Firstly, relevant factors affecting stakeholder strategies were investigated, and a tripartite evolutionary game model was established. Subsequently, evolutionarily stable strategies and corresponding conditions were examined. Finally, numerical simulations were conducted to illustrate stakeholders' behavioral strategies and their sensitivity to main factors in each stage of the PRB industry. The research results suggest that the government plays a leadership role in the initial stage; as the PRB industry matures, the government gradually decreases its intervention in the PRB market and eventually withdraws from the market. In addition, the results demonstrate that low subsidies and low penalties are not helpful to the evolution of the optimal solution for the three stakeholders, and high supervision cost reduces the government's regulatory willingness, which hinders developers and homebuyers from choosing the PRB strategy. A promotion mechanism is accordingly proposed to help achieve the orderly and sustainable development of PRBs in China's building sector.