Strategic interactions in environmental regulation enforcement: evidence from Chinese cities

Environmental regulation policy is the main means of pollution control and emission reduction and plays an irreplaceable role in environmental governance. However, due to the competitive behavior of economic development, the local government cannot effectively use the efficiency of environmental regulation to reduce the emission of environmental pollution. Taking 284 prefecture-level cities in China from 2005 to 2016 as samples, this paper studies the strategic interaction of environmental regulation enforcement by local governments under different circumstances and its impact on environmental pollution, so as to provide reference for national overall environmental governance planning. Through the research, it is found that the strategic interaction of environmental regulation enforcement among Chinese cities is characterized by the race-to-the-top. And the strategic interaction of environmental regulation enforcement among cities of the same economic level has the strongest impact. Besides, the impact of environmental regulation on environmental pollution has different intensity in different scenarios, showing a non-positive correlation. Most importantly, the Pollution Paradise exists in some cities under special circumstances.