公司治理
主权财富基金
国家所有制
国家(计算机科学)
代理(哲学)
政治
收入
国家资本主义
经济
市场经济
透视图(图形)
业务
委托代理问题
资本主义
现金
新兴市场
经济体制
外国所有权
实证研究
控制(管理)
资产(计算机安全)
代理成本
共同所有权
金融市场
作者
William L. Megginson,Peter Mueller,Alina Munteanu,Leonid Pugachev
摘要
ABSTRACT Research Question/Issue Why have state owned enterprises (SOEs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) grown so dramatically in the 21st century, despite the well‐known drawbacks of state ownership? How do countries choose between the two forms of state intervention? We survey theoretical and empirical literature and consider recent geo‐political phenomena to explore these issues. Research Findings/Insights Recent phenomena of deglobalization, a technological arms race, political and economic shocks, and rising energy prices can rationalize state capitalism's resurgence and also explain why SWFs have grown faster than SOEs. Theoretical/Academic Implications Four theories related to state ownership are examined to show that each applies differentially to SOEs and SWFs. A branch of agency theory, the agency costs of free cash flow, is extended into the domain of state ownership to explain SWFs' concentration in countries with significant SOE activity. Practitioner/Policy Implications Governance and institutional safeguards determine whether state capitalism builds or squanders citizens' value. Policymakers can use SOEs and SWFs to remedy different market imperfections. SWFs offer a lucrative outlet to redeploy revenues outside an opportunity‐limited SOE. SWFs also offer more discreet exposure to foreign markets.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI