High Performance or Just Giving a Performance? The Effects of Performative Work on Promotability

The identification and recognition of high performance is a central objective for organizations, as both managers and organizations seek to distinguish top performers, while employees actively strive to be perceived as such. In spite of this, there may be incongruities between what managers know and what employees want them to know about their performance quality, leading employees to engage in performative work— highly visible work behaviors employees engage in with the intent of signaling high performance. In line with this, I draw upon signaling theory to propose that performative work serves as a costly signal of high performance, resulting in reputational rewards from managers. Further, I propose job performance as a moderator of these effects, such that low performers who engage in performative work incur penalty costs in the form of decreased perceptions of competence, commitment, and promotability. To test these ideas, in Study 1 I generate and validate a measure of performative work. In Study 2, I conduct an experimental test of the effects of performative work, finding that performative work results in increased managerial perceptions of work commitment, competence, and promotability. Furthermore, I found support for job performance as a moderator of these relations (albeit in the opposite direction than hypothesized), suggesting that low-performing employees receive greater (rather than lesser) reputational rewards upon engaging in performative work. I discuss the implications for theory and practice.