持久性(不连续性)
政治
人口经济学
经济
期限(时间)
劳动经济学
心理学
社会心理学
政治学
测量数据收集
面板数据
百分点
小组调查
作者
Marco Faravelli,Umair Khalil,Sundar Ponnusamy
摘要
Abstract A procedural rule in Indian elections requires candidates to pay a nominal deposit, which is forfeited on obtaining fewer than one-sixth of the votes. Forfeiture diminishes female recontesting by 13.3 percentage points in the following election (relative effect size of 68%). We find no such effects for men. These effects are persistent and discourage female candidates in the long term as well. States with more regressive gender norms exhibit stronger findings, with female forfeiters also being 11.8 percentage points less likely to win the following election. We enhance our analysis by conducting a survey experiment with representative voters.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI