股东
面板数据
工具变量
校长(计算机安全)
Probit模型
计量经济学
委托代理问题
会计
业务
对偶(序理论)
管理(神学)
变量(数学)
经济
固定效应模型
变量
公司治理
统计
数学
财务
法学
政治学
计算机科学
离散数学
政治
操作系统
数学分析
摘要
This paper explores if controlling shareholders' influence on the board structure allows entrenchment or alignment effects to prevail. Informed primarily by the principal–principal theory and supported by the stewardship and resource dependence theories, this study samples 235 publicly listed Philippine firms from 2015 to 2019 and employs instrumental variable fixed effect panel and probit regression analyses. Results show ownership concentration is positively associated with the proportion of nonindependent, nonexecutive directors on the board and the likelihood of CEO duality, indicating that boards are not completely independent and are likely to generate entrenchment effects.
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