偏差(统计)
计算机安全
控制(管理)
计算机科学
心理学
运营管理
工程类
人工智能
机器学习
作者
Yan Wang,Zhenyuan Wang
标识
DOI:10.5465/amproc.2024.12779abstract
摘要
Algorithmic control has been widely adopted by online labor platforms to ensure that workers consistently deliver quality services. However, extensive evidence suggests that platform workers under the tight control of algorithms still regularly engage in customer-directed deviant behavior, thus raising questions about the effectiveness of algorithmic control. To address this critical tension, the authors draw on ego depletion theory to examine why and when algorithmic control fails in constraining worker customer-directed deviant behavior. The present study conducted an online questionnaire survey at three time points with 377 ride-hailing drivers in China. Data were analyzed with structural equation models. The results show that algorithmic control does help reduce worker customer-directed deviance, but it also results in worker ego depletion, which in turn creates conditions for more undesirable behavior toward customers. Algorithmic transparency alleviates the influence of algorithmic control on ego depletion and financial dependence on platform work mitigates the impact of ego depletion on customer-directed deviance. The indirect effect via ego depletion is more pronounced when algorithmic transparency and financial dependence are both low. The study provides feasible directions to optimize algorithmic control system design and reduce customer-directed deviant behavior.
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