Patronage Networks and Elite Cohesion in Russia: Evidence from the Recruitment of the Gubernatorial Corps

Abstract How is elite cohesion possible in a patronalistic regime? Drawing on the theory of patronal politics and social network analysis, it is shown that the federal-level elites have been involved in the decision-making with respect to the recruitment of the gubernatorial corps in Russia. The analysis has revealed a clear pattern towards the complexity and monocentrism accompanied with the growing levels of cohesion of the patronal network that combines governors and their federal patrons. It allows the authors to argue that subnational appointments can be considered as a power-sharing tool for the ruling elite. The evolution of the network structure, though with some time delay, refers to the stages ranging from a competing to a single-pyramid system in terms of Henry Hale. Over the period, elites close to the president have almost monopolized the recruitment of governors. On the other hand, the number of patrons grows gradually, preserving the increase in the levels of network cohesion.