激励
业务
并购
平衡(能力)
产业组织
经济
进入壁垒
资产负债表
竞赛(生物学)
国际贸易
财务
阻塞(统计)
会计
营销
研究理事会
情感(语言学)
金融体系
公共经济学
国际经济学
商业
货币经济学
金融市场
作者
Chris Teh,Dyuti Banerjee,Chengsi Wang
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2026-05-12
被引量:3
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2024.07841
摘要
We study how acquisitions by a dominant incumbent affect entry and R&D incentives in markets with multiple startups. We show that acquisitions can create a kill zone, which suppresses entry and distorts the innovation direction of nontargeted startups. The resulting reduced threat of entry may lead the incumbent to shelve the acquired technology. The kill zone effect strengthens targeted startups’ incentives to enter primarily to be bought out and makes acquisitions more attractive to the incumbent than in-house R&D. To balance kill zone distortions to innovation against the potential synergies from acquisitions, a consumer welfare–maximizing merger policy may involve blocking some, but not all, acquisitions. This paper was accepted by Anita McGahan, strategy. Funding: C. Wang thanks the Australian Research Council Discovery Project [Grant DP210102015] for the generous financial support. C. Teh thanks the European Research Council (ERC) [Grant 101088307] for the generous financial support. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07841 .
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