审计
斯塔克伯格竞赛
业务
供应链
结果(博弈论)
还原(数学)
信息不对称
供应商关系管理
供应链管理
逃避(道德)
产业组织
信号游戏
博弈论
营销
过程管理
不确定度归约理论
微观经济学
隐蔽的
消费者信息
完美信息
计算机科学
风险分析(工程)
作者
Lirong Wu,Xusheng Han,Yonggang Li
出处
期刊:Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics
[Emerald Publishing Limited]
日期:2025-10-02
卷期号:38 (8): 2256-2279
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1108/apjml-03-2025-0384
摘要
Purpose To motivate supplier to exert more carbon reduction efforts, we study the interaction between carbon information acquisition methods (audit vs blockchain) and the information disclosure strategies. Design/methodology/approach This paper examines a supply chain involving a supplier with the capability to evade and a dominant retailer who manages the supplier by setting carbon reduction targets (CRT). The retailer must decide on an information acquisition method – either audit or blockchain – and whether to disclose the supplier’s carbon information. Using a Stackelberg game framework, we analyze the optimal strategies for supply chain members through four models that capture the equilibrium outcomes. Findings First, with audit, the retailer’s disclosure strategy improves the supplier’s CRT achievement only if the evasion cost exceeds a threshold, while with blockchain, it always improves the supplier’s CRT achievement regardless of evasion cost. Second, the retailer prefers blockchain when CRT is high and prefers audits when CRT is low. Third, blockchain and disclosure lead to a “win–win” outcome when consumers information acquisition ability is low and CRT is high; audit and concealing achieve a similar “win–win” outcome when consumers’ information acquisition ability is high. Originality/value As far as we are aware, this paper is pioneering in conducting an analytical study to investigate the interplay between information acquisition methods and information disclosure strategies to motivate supplier to exert more carbon reduction efforts.
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