立法机关
自由裁量权
官僚主义
自治
政治学
政治
公共行政
法律与经济学
公共政策
法学
社会学
作者
John D. Huber,Charles R. Shipan
出处
期刊:Cambridge University Press eBooks
[Cambridge University Press]
日期:2002-09-02
被引量:1261
标识
DOI:10.1017/cbo9780511804915
摘要
The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in efforts to micromanage policy-making processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial autonomy to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address this issue by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the American states, they argue that particular institutional forms have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policy making process.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI