声誉
激励
比较静力学
重复博弈
吓阻理论
自然实验
经济
微观经济学
人口
订单(交换)
政治学
博弈论
社会学
法学
人口学
统计
数学
财务
作者
Dustin H. Tingley,Barbara F. Walter
标识
DOI:10.1017/s0020818311000026
摘要
What effect does repeated play have on reputation building? The literature on international relations remains divided on whether, when, and how reputation matters in both interstate and intrastate conflict. We examine reputation building through a series of incentivized laboratory experiments. Using comparative statics from a repeated entry-deterrence game, we isolate how incentives for reputation building should change as the number of entrants changes. We find that subjects in our experiments generally build reputations and that those investments pay off, but we also find that some subjects did not react to incentives to build reputation in ways our model had predicted. In order to explain this, we focus on the heterogeneity of preferences and cognitive abilities that may exist in any population. Our research suggests that rational-choice scholars of international relations and those using more psychologically based explanations have more common ground than previously articulated.
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