Assessing the impact of officials' turnover on urban economic efficiency: From the perspective of political promotion incentive and power rent-seeking incentive

China's economy has shifted from the stage of rapid growth to high-quality development. However, officials' turnover is very frequent in China. To comprehensively examine the impact of officials' turnover on the quality of the economy, this paper studies the relationship between officials' turnover and urban economic efficiency. This article adds officials' attributes of homo politicus and homo economicus into the theoretical model and employs data for 282 prefecture-level cities in China to test the impact of city secretary turnover on urban economic efficiency. The results show that officials' turnover has a negative impact on urban economic efficiency. The change in core officials mainly inhibits urban economic efficiency by reducing the quality of credit and the efficiency of land resource allocation. Further analysis shows that there is regional heterogeneity in the impact of officials' turnover on urban economic efficiency.