全渠道
杠杆(统计)
溢出效应
能见度
业务
帕累托原理
服务(商务)
计算机科学
佣金
营销
消费者选择
产业组织
服务水平
共享经济
模式(计算机接口)
符号
经济盈余
帕累托最优
众包
过程管理
电信服务
表(数据库)
纵向一体化
作者
Yuangang Zheng,Hongguang Bo
摘要
Abstract Platforms, initially introducing services to attract online consumers, are increasingly providing omnichannel services to enhance offline retailers’ visibility and generate commission revenue. This paper constructs three game‐theoretic scenarios (no service, independent services, and omnichannel services) to investigate these impacts and identify the conditions for achieving win–win outcomes. Our findings reveal that the platform always prefers introducing services to gain a competitive advantage, although retailers benefit from services with high spillover effects. With omnichannel services, the commission mechanism motivates the platform to steer consumers toward the retailer. Concurrently, the retailer is willing to pay higher commissions to leverage this enhanced visibility and capture platform‐driven demand. Furthermore, consumer price reference behavior intensifies price competition, particularly when all consumers have access to both entities, making it more difficult for either to profit. Finally, we identify the Pareto improvement intervals, revealing that only the omnichannel service strategy leads to overall Pareto improvement.
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