Closer ASEAN-Japan Relations amid Great Power Transition in the 21st Century?

AbstractWhile Japan and the ASEAN states can celebrate the Golden Jubilees of the ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation and the Fukuda Doctrine, there is no room for complacency. Both sides must assiduously cultivate a closer and comprehensive relationship in the decades ahead for mutual support and benefits. A cordial and cooperative relationship will boost the capability of Japan and the ASEAN states to have greater agency to act autonomously in a new epoch threatening to suck them into the vortex of a New Cold War bipolarity between the competing US and Chinese superpowers. Notes1 For a useful chronology and review of Japan-ASEAN relations, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan and ASEAN,” e-brochure, March 2023. Accessed: July 2, 2023. See also Kei Koga, “Japan’s Policy toward ASEAN in 2023,” Commentary, Stimson Center, January 25, 2023. Accessed: July 2, 2023.2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Expert Panel for the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation,” September 9, 2022. Accessed: July 4, 2023.3 An elaboration of this pillar reads: “Cooperate in establishing a fair regional order based on rules based on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Maintain, enhance the role of ASEAN architecture and ASEAN centrality and unity. (e.g., jointly promote efforts to ease tensions in the region over the long term; strengthen the ASEAN architecture; support the strengthening of the ASEAN Secretariat’s organization and functions; promote security cooperation).” See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Expert Panel for the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation,” February 2023. July 4, 2023.4 See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Submission of the Expert Meeting of the 59th Anniversary of Japan-ASEAN Friendship and Cooperation (Results),” February 3, 2023. Accessed: July 4, 2023.5 The ad verbatim of Fukuda Takeo’s three tenets reads: “First, Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power, and on that basis is resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia, and of the world community. Second, Japan, as a true friend of the countries of Southeast Asia, will do its best for consolidating the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on “heart-to-heart” understanding with these countries, in wide-ranging fields covering not only political and economic areas but also social and cultural areas. Third, Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its member countries and cooperate positively with them in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, together with other nations of the like mind outside the region, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina and will thus contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia.” See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Speech by Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, August 18, 1977, Manila. From the “World and Japan Database.” Accessed June 30, 2023.6 See Lam Peng Er (ed.), Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Fukuda Doctrine and Beyond (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).7 Sharon Seah et al., The State of Southeast Asia 2023 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEA-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2023) p.50. Accessed: June 30, 2023.8 See Lam Peng Er, “Japan’s Quest for ‘Soft Power’: Attraction and Limitation,” East Asia, Vol.24, No.4, 2007.9 Japan sought to play a mediatory role in Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaysia, but its tentative overtures between 1963 and 1966 amounted to nothing diplomatically. See Giulia Garbagni, “‘Better to be a chicken’s head than an ox’s tail’: Japanese envoy diplomacy in the mediation of Konfrontasi (1965),” Cold War History, January 2023. . Accessed: June 30, 2023.10 There is the stereotype that Japan adopted an active foreign policy including its first UNPKO mission to Cambodia after being criticized for its so-called cheque book diplomacy during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. To be sure, Japan was already seeking to play an active peacemaking role in Cambodia even before the outbreak of the Gulf War.11 Hiroshi Kato, “Japan’s ODA 1954-2014: Changes and Continuities in a Central Instrument in Japan’s Foreign Policy” in Hiroshi Kato, John Page, and Yasutami Shinomura (eds.), Japan’s Development Assistance: Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) p.3.12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, White Paper on Development Cooperation 2020: Japan’s International Cooperation: International cooperation in the COVID-19 era: our commitment to the future. March 2021, p.114. . Accessed: July 2, 2023.13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Asian Economic Crisis and Japan’s Contribution,” October 2000. Accessed: July 2, 2023.14 See Paul Midford, Overcoming Isolationism: Japan’s Leadership in East Asian Security Multilateralism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020).15 JAIF, Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund, Brochure (Jakarta: JAIF, ASEAN Secretariat, 2022). . Accessed: June 30, 2023.16 Japan International Cooperation Center, “JICE’s International Exchange,” 2018. . Accessed: June 30, 2023.17 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Special ASEAN-Japan Ministerial Meeting (Overview),” April 9, 2011. . Accessed: July 2, 2023.18 ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN-Japan: Building on Relations to Face Future Challenges,” April 9, 2011. Accessed: July 2, 2023.19 Ibid.20 Lam Peng Er, Japan’s Peacebuilding Diplomatic in Asia: Seeking an Active Political Role (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).21 May Wong and Darrelle Ng, “Japanese peacemaker brokers rare but shaky truce between Myanmar’s military and Rakhine ethnic group,” Channel News Asia (Singapore), February 16, 2023. . Accessed: June 30, 2023. On Japan’s “special relationship” with Myanmar, see Lam Peng Er, “Myanmar: Japan’s ‘Last Frontier’ in Asia?,” Asian Survey, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2016, pp. 512-531.22 Ezra Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).23 The 2001 METI White Paper wrote: “Cross-border international specialization in East Asia is becoming more intermeshed, prompting greater economic interdependence. … China has rapidly expanded its production capacity in a wide range of areas from the comparatively labor-intensive textile industry through to the comparatively technology-intensive information industry. As a result, even as East Asian interdependence deepens, the ‘flying geese’ pattern of development which has characterized the region to date is giving way to a new pattern … ” See Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, White Paper on International Trade Key Points: External Economic Policy Challenges in the 21st Century, May 18, 2001, p.5. Accessed: June 30, 2023.24 Sharon Seah et al., The State of Southeast Asia 2023 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEA-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2023) p.3. Accessed: June 30, 2023.25 See Lam Peng Er, “Japan’s Relations with Mekong Basin Countries: Diplomacy, Markets and Community,” East Asian Policy: An International Quarterly, Vol.5, No.3, 2013.26 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Official Security Assistance,” April 5, 2023. Accessed: July 3, 2023. For the OSA concept paper, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Concept Paper: Official Security Assistance,” April 2023. Accessed: July 3, 2023. The concept paper elaborated: “Japan will provide equipment and supplies as well as assistance for infrastructures development to the countries with a view to strengthening their security capacities and improving their deterrence capabilities.” The OSA’s project details include: “OSA will be limited to fields not directly relating to any international conflict, including: 1) Activities for ensuring peace, stability and security based on the rule of law Example: Monitoring and surveillance in territorial waters and airspace, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, etc. 2) Humanitarian activities Example: Disaster response, search and rescue, medical care, transport of relief goods, etc. 3) International peace cooperation operations Example: Capacity building to participate in Peacekeeping operations, etc.”27 Ibid., “Official Security Assistance.”28 ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 2019. . Accessed: July 3, 2023.29 Gabriel Dominguez, “Why Japan still leads in Southeast Asian infrastructure investment,” Japan Times, December 6, 2022. Accessed: July 3, 2023. According to Bloomberg, Japan has pending infrastructure projects worth $367 billion. Bloomberg noted: “Japan is still winning the Southeast Asia infrastructure race against China, with pending projects worth almost one and a half times its rival, according to the latest data from Fitch Solutions.” See Michelle Jamrisko, “China No Match for Japan in Southeast Asia Infrastructure Race,” Bloomberg, June 23, 2019. . Accessed: July 3, 2023.30 “Aso, Watanabe awarded medals by Myanmar military regime,” Asahi Shimbun newspaper, February 22, 2023. Accessed: July 3, 2023.31 See John D. Ciorciari and Kiyoteru Tsutsui (eds.), The Courteous Power: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific Era (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021).32 See Lam Peng Er, “Japan’s rivalry with China in Southeast Asia: ODA, the AIIB, infrastructural projects, the Mekong Basin and the disputed South China Sea” in James D.J. Brown and Jeff Kingston, Japan’s Foreign Relations in Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2018) pp.158-172.33 Lam Peng Er (ed.), South Korea’s New Southern Policy: A Middle Power’s International Relations with Southeast Asia and India (London and New York: Routledge, 2023).34 National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, “Population Projection for Japan: 2011 to 2060,” January 2012. . Accessed: July 5, 2023.35 Population Pyramid, “Population Pyramids of the World from 1950 to 2100: Southeast Asia 2060.” Accessed: July 5, 2023.Additional informationNotes on contributorsLam Peng ErLAM Peng Er is Principal Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute. He obtained his PhD from Columbia University. His articles on comparative politics and international relations in Asia, with a focus on Japan, have appeared in Pacific Affairs, Asian Survey, Asian Affairs, Japan Forum, AND Government and Opposition. His books include the single-authored Japan’s Peace Building Diplomacy in Asia: Searching for an Active Political Role (Routledge, 2009) and Green Politics in Japan (Routledge, 1999), as well as edited and co-edited volumes such as Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: Continuity and Change (Lexington Books, 2020), China-Japan Relations in the 21st Century: Antagonism Despite Interdependency (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), and Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Fukuda Doctrine and Beyond (Routledge, 2013). He is also an executive editor of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding and East Asian Policy. Lam is the Singapore Country Coordinator for NEAT (Network of East Asian Think Tanks) and NACT (Network of ASEAN China Think Tanks).