责备
搭便车问题
计算机科学
运筹学
心理学
数理经济学
经济
社会心理学
微观经济学
数学
公共物品
作者
Xinyu Li,Wendelin Schnedler
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2025-01-24
卷期号:71 (10): 8252-8266
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567
摘要
Teams are formed because input from different people is needed. Providing incentives to team members, however, can be difficult. According to received wisdom, declaring all members responsible fails because real responsibility for team output “diffuses.” But why? Also, why and when does formally declaring one member “responsible” mean that this member can be attributed real responsibility? We offer a model that answers these questions. We identify when jointly declaring a team responsible results in reputation free riding. We show that declaring one person responsible can overcome this problem but only if all other team members are protected from being sanctioned. This paper was accepted by Dorothea Kübler, behavioral economics and decision analysis.
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