透明度(行为)
会计
业务
样品(材料)
变量
政治学
法学
化学
色谱法
机器学习
计算机科学
作者
Hui L. James,Thanh Ngo,Hongxia Wang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.najef.2021.101413
摘要
We examine the impact of independent director tenure on corporate transparency. Using a sample of 12,423 firm-year observations from 1997 to 2017, we find that corporate transparency increases in independent director tenure. The results are robust to various variable definitions and model specifications, providing strong evidence supporting the Expertise hypothesis that long-tenured independent directors are better monitors and advisors. We conclude that long-tenured directors benefit firms and their investors by enhancing firm transparency and reducing information risk. Capping independent director tenure is not always beneficial.
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