还原(数学)
降低成本
供应链
碳排放税
微观经济学
纳什均衡
碳纤维
成本分摊
博弈论
计算机科学
业务
产业组织
环境经济学
经济
温室气体
数学
营销
算法
生态学
几何学
复合数
生物
政治学
法学
作者
Honghu Gao,Shifeng Liu,Daning Xing,Guangmei Cao
标识
DOI:10.1080/09720529.2018.1479165
摘要
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain system of cooperative emission reduction model consisting of one manufacture and one retailer under carbon tax policy. This paper analyzes the game model of total cooperation, completely uncooperative and emission reduction cost sharing, the results show that the cost-sharing factor of carbon emission reduction affects the emission reduction level in three kinds of games, and the cost-sharing factor of carbon emission reduction also affects the profits under completely uncooperative and emission reduction cost sharing model, there is a double side-effect effect in the decision-making model of total non-cooperation and emission reduction cost sharing model. We also proposal a coordination contract of Nash negotiated wholesale price contracts that can improve profits of both sides and realize the perfect coordination of both sides, finally we validate the effectiveness and environmental of the contracts through numerical examples.
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