People are more Sceptical of others' public virtue motivations than their own in separate (but not joint) evaluations

Abstract Public acts of virtue can promote prosocial norms yet are often met with moral scepticism – a phenomenon known as virtue discounting. What psychological processes might underlie people's propensity to both discount others' public virtue and also engage in it themselves? We examine one possible explanation: whether people expect their own public virtuous behaviour to be judged more favourably than others' similar actions. Across four pre‐registered studies ( N = 2511), we tested for self‐serving asymmetries in moral expectations. In three between‐subjects experiments, participants either anticipated how others would evaluate their own actions (meta‐perceptions) or judged the actions of another person (third‐party judgements). Study 1 found no asymmetry in moral goodness. But in Studies 2 and 3, participants expected their own public virtue to be judged as more principled (and more morally good, in Study 2), less reputation‐driven, and more trustworthy. Study 3 showed these asymmetries held across multiple perspectives. In contrast, Study 4 used a within‐subjects design and found that self‐serving asymmetries disappeared when judgements were made side by side. Together, these findings clarify how self‐enhancement shapes moral expectations under naturalistic conditions and extend research on moral self‐enhancement beyond trait judgements to public virtue and its perceived motivation.