公司治理
建议(编程)
委托代理问题
代理(哲学)
业务
公共关系
透视图(图形)
营销
政治学
社会学
社会科学
财务
人工智能
计算机科学
程序设计语言
作者
Michael L. McDonald,Poonam Khanna,James D. Westphal
标识
DOI:10.5465/amj.2008.32625969
摘要
This article contributes to the social networks literature by examining how corporate governance factors influence CEOs' external advice-seeking behaviors. We incorporate insights from social networks research into an agency theory perspective to predict, and demonstrate empirically, that governance factors recommended by agency theory increase CEOs' tendencies to seek out advice contacts who are likely to offer perspectives on strategic issues that differ from their own; these advice-seeking behaviors ultimately enhance firm performance. Accordingly, this article also contributes to the corporate governance literature by describing how and why CEOs' advice networks mediate the effects of governance factors on firm performance.
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