Seeing Goal-Directedness: A Case for Social Perception

This article focuses on social perception, an area of research that lies at the interface between the philosophy of perception and the scientific investigation of human social cognition. Some philosophers and psychologists appeal to resonance mechanisms to show that intentional and goal-directed actions can be perceived. Against these approaches, I show that there is a class of simple goal-directed actions, whose perception does not rely on resonance. I discuss the role of the superior temporal sulcus as the possible neural correlate of perception of goal-directed actions. My proposal is intermediate between claims according to which we perceive intentional actions and claims according to which we cannot perceive goal-directed actions. 1. Preliminary Clarifications and Methodology2. Does the Perception of Goal-Directed Actions Rest on Resonance?3. What Are the Neural Correlates of Social Perception (without Resonance)?4. From Neural Correlates to the Experience of Goal-Directed Actions5. The Development of the Perception of Goal-Directed Actions: A Possible New Role for Resonance6. Conclusion: Seeing Goal-Directedness of Actions and Social Perception