Perverse Incentive Structure and Policy Implementation Gap in China’s Local Environmental Politics

The obvious paradox within China’s environmental politics is the big gap between the central government’s policy and its implementation outcomes at local levels. Despite concerns about implementation at the local level, much about the role of central governments in China’s local environmental politics is still poorly understood. This article examines how the incentive structure set by the central authorities affects the policy implementation gap at the local level. Drawing on fieldwork and document analysis, this article argues that the incentives set by the central government regarding environmental policy implementation at local levels are perversely structured, meaning that the central government provides much more incentive for local governments’ nonimplementation or poor implementation of its environmental policies than it provides for full implementation. The central government’s failure to encourage — politically, financially, as well as morally—local government officials to appropriately implement environmental policies can partly explain the production of the policy implementation gap at the local level. This implementation gap cannot be overcome by efforts at the local level unless the central government takes significant measures to address the perverse incentive structure embedded in the overall structure of China’s local environmental politics .