逆向选择
免赔额
经济
对偶(语法数字)
一般化
垄断
期望效用假设
微观经济学
精算学
数理经济学
计量经济学
数学
文学类
数学分析
艺术
作者
Alex Gershkov,Benny Moldovanu,Philipp Strack,Mengxi Zhang
摘要
We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz 1977) where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent’s risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains patterns of observed customer behavior and predicts insurance contracts most often observed in practice: these consist of menus of several deductible-premium pairs or menus of insurance with coverage limits–premium pairs. A main departure from the classical insurance literature is obtained here by endowing the agents with risk-averse preferences that can be represented by a dual utility functional (Yaari 1987). (JEL D81, D82, D86, D91, G22)
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