公司治理
绿色洗涤
业务
政府(语言学)
控制(管理)
信息不对称
公开披露
政府监管
质量(理念)
环境治理
公共政策
公共信息
信息质量
利益相关者
环境政策
可持续发展
环境经济学
经济
公共经济学
作者
Xinxin Yu,Majid Murad,Chen Chen,Tao Wang,Ximeng Jia
摘要
ABSTRACT Sustainable development necessitates “good citizens” rather than “good actors” in environmental governance. This study employs data on Chinese A‐share listed companies spanning 2012 to 2023 and finds that artificial intelligence (AI) exerts a suppressive impact on corporate tactical environmental information disclosure (TEID). Specifically, AI exerts a linear suppressive effect on excessive tactical disclosure and greenwashing behaviors, whereas it exhibits an inverted U‐shaped relationship with brownwashing, initially promoting and then inhibiting such behaviors. The underlying mechanisms operate through three channels: enhancing internal control quality, alleviating financing constraints, and mitigating information asymmetry. Government regulation amplifies these suppressive effects, whereas public demands only reinforce the inhibition of excessive tactical disclosure and greenwashing. Heterogeneous analysis reveals that under strong regulatory regimes, the synergy between AI and regulation primarily enhances internal control quality and mitigates information asymmetry; under weak regulation, their interaction mainly alleviates financing constraints. The suppressive effects are more pronounced for high‐pollution, manufacturing, and technology‐intensive firms. This study contributes theoretical insights into AI's role in corporate environmental governance and offers targeted policy implications for governments when formulating environmental information disclosure regulations.
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