亲社会行为
移情
独裁者赛局
社会心理学
心理学
利他主义(生物学)
互惠(文化人类学)
人际反应指数
声誉
独裁者
人际交往
社会偏好
透视法
政治学
政治
法学
作者
Frauke von Bieberstein,Andrea Essl,Kathrin Friedrich
出处
期刊:PLOS ONE
[Public Library of Science]
日期:2021-08-12
卷期号:16 (8): e0255071-e0255071
被引量:6
标识
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0255071
摘要
Indirect reciprocity has been proposed to explain prosocial behavior among strangers, whereby the prosocial act is returned by a third party. However, what happens if the prosocial act cannot be observed by the third party? Here, we examine whether empathy serves as a clue for prosociality and whether people are more generous toward more empathetic people. In a laboratory study, we measured prosocial behavior as the amount sent in the dictator game and empathy based on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). By using an incentivized task, we find that people believe that more empathetic participants send more money in the dictator game. Thus, people see empathy as a clue for prosocial behavior. Furthermore, in a second dictator game, participants indirectly reciprocate by sending more money to more empathetic recipients. Therefore, we suggest that empathy can replace a reputation derived from observable prosocial behavior in triggering indirect reciprocity.
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