社会保障
休克(循环)
经济
公共财政
退休金
投票
生产力
工资
国家(计算机科学)
多数决原则
人口
劳动经济学
公共经济学
政治学
宏观经济学
市场经济
法学
社会学
财务
人口学
内科学
政治
医学
计算机科学
算法
作者
Georges Casamatta,Helmuth Cremer,Pierre Pestieau
标识
DOI:10.1023/a:1011214823251
摘要
We assume that individual voters differ not only according to age but also productivity. In the steady state, workers with wages in the intermediate range join the retired persons to form a majority and vote for a positive level of social security. When a shock decreases population growth, entrenched interests can constrain majority voting decisions and prevent reforms in the name of entitlements. We show that from a Rawlsian viewpoint it may be desirable to rely on these entitlements to protect the low wage earners of the transition generations. However, when the possibility of fixing a basic pension is introduced, it constitutes a better instrument than entitlements.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI