工业共生体系
分解者
业务
还原(数学)
碳纤维
环境经济学
自然资源经济学
生态学
经济
计算机科学
生物
生态系统
几何学
算法
数学
复合数
作者
Haiyan Shan,Junliang Yang,Guo Wei
标识
DOI:10.3390/ijerph16071093
摘要
The carbon emission problem in China needs to be solved urgently. Industrial symbiosis, as an effective means to improve resource efficiency, can better alleviate the carbon emission problem. Under such a circumstance, this paper regards an industrial symbiosis system as a collection of producers, consumers and decomposers, and analyzes the strategic selections and behavioral characteristics of their carbon emission reduction activities through a tripartite evolutionary game model, and then the effects of related parameters on the evolutionary stable strategies of stakeholders are discussed. The results demonstrate that: (1) the regular return and the rate of return determine the ability of stakeholders to undertake carbon reduction activities; (2) the initial willingness of stakeholders to participate will affect the evolutionary speed of the strategies; (3) a high opportunity cost reduces the inertia of stakeholders to carry out carbon emission reductions; (4) producers, consumers and decomposers can avoid “free rides” by signing agreements or adopting punitive measures.
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