Leading Small Groups, Agency Coordination, and Policy Making in China

Leading small groups (领导小组, LSGs) are widely presumed to be the most important mechanisms for coordinating policy among the various government and Party bureaucracies in the Chinese political system. This article evaluates this assumption through a combination of statistical and case study analyses of LSGs operating under the State Council. Using information on 26 groups formed between 2004 and 2015, I estimate the effect of LSG participation on joint policy making. I demonstrate that some LSGs coordinate more effectively than others and argue that the reason for variation can be found in two factors: bureaucratic policy conflict and group leader authority. I argue that leader authority can spur agency coordination and move policy forward, while bureaucratic conflict can otherwise hinder coordination and create policy delays. Interaction between the two factors shapes the effectiveness of an LSG. A detailed case study of the two groups formed to promote health system reform, coupled with a shadow case study of the group for promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, illustrates the plausibility of the proposed mechanisms. Bureaucratic conflict and leader authority play important roles in China’s policy coordination processes.